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Westminster, 1984],61-76). In part I1 some articles on poetry may lack the depth 
which their recommendation suggests (e.g., two cited at item #516, 117). O n  
Psalms, notwithstanding his layman's disclaimers, C. S. Lewis' Reflections on the 
Psalms fits wonderfully and qualitatively into the category called "Other." 
Negligible, but significant, typographical miscues compare Murphy 
O'Connor (#533) with Kugel (#534) instead of with Kugel (#535) on technical 
arguments against notions of meter and parallelism in Hebrew poetry; McDaniel 
(#762) with Kaiser (#773), on Sumerian influence upon Lamentations, instead of 
with Gwaltney (#775) who, in turn, is mistakenly constrasted with Gurewicz 
(#761) instead of with McDaniel (#762). Bosman (#781), on structural analysis of 
Lamentations, is cross-referenced to Moore (#776), rather than to Renkema (#778). 
Then, there is the inconsistent transliteration of Hebrew terms (cf. #20, #153, 
#168). Beyond these, the mischief of printer's devils is limited enough to quickly 
cite: Elihu "a spokesmen" instead of "spokesmann (88), "Contique" for "Cantique" 
(156), and page header "Larnations" for "Lamentations" (161, 163). 
But these are trivia, insufficient to detract from Enns', IBR's, and Baker 
Books' service to O T  scholarship. Because of their work, O T  wisdom and poetry 
research now possesses a very useful survey, and is certain to profit again when its 
sequel appears in five years' time. 
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For many people, postmodernism and pluralism seem deeply inhospitable to 
truth. Relativism, if not nihilism, seems like a disturbingly common outcome of 
attachment to postmodern thought. Any approach to life that renders us unable 
to protest the torture of children, the rape of the land, the degradation of women, 
the random dissolutions of families, or the proliferation of warfare, terrorism, and 
gang violence is worth rejecting. If every option is acceptable from someone's 
perspective, then we have no way of resisting evil. And, if the inability to resist 
evil is the price of endorsing postmodernism, it is too high a price to pay. 
"Postmodernism" is a notoriously fluid term. But what all the varieties of 
postmodernism have in common is their rejection of the Enlightenment as a final 
resting place for human thought. Enlightenment thinkers believed that the post- 
Reformation religious conflicts that claimed so many lives could be avoided if people 
could find a basis for moral action and political choice that was independent of 
religious convictions. Because religious disagreement lay at the root of so much 
violence, it would be impossible to avoid this violence by appealing to religious 
convictions which were themselves in dispute. What was needed instead, said the 
thinkers of the Enlightenment, was an account of normative judgment that exhibited 
the rationality people believed was typical of science. O n  the basis of such an 
account, it would be possible to craft moral and political standards that would appeal 
to people whatever their religious beliefs. As a result, social harmony would be 
possible despite profound religious disagreement. 
It was in many ways an attractive notion. The problem was that it was 
incorrect. The foundations on the basis of which Enlightenment thinkers tried to 
base morality and politics proved to be very thin ones. The assumptions on which 
all rational people would supposedly have to agree were few in number and not 
very substantial. The moral and political judgments Enlightenment and post- 
Enlightenment thinkers often sought to defend seemed to depend on beliefs about 
the nature of humanness and the place of human beings in the world that were 
anything but obvious to "all rational people." Understood in the limited way 
required by the Enlightenment project, reason turned out to be compatible with 
a wide range of worldviews. 
One way of understanding postmodernism is to see it as a response to this 
realization. The kind of postmodernism that has received the most press is what I call 
"anarchic" postmodernism. This variety of postmodernism responds to the failure of 
the Enlightenment project by announcing-whether enthusiastically or 
dolefully-that there simply are no persuasive reasons to adopt one belief or course 
of action in preference to another. Anarchic postmodernism celebrates the chaos of 
contemporary life. 
It is obvious that this sort of postmodernism is an attractive option only for a very 
limited number of people. If you are materially comfortable, free from conflict and 
stress, and able to contemplate radical transformations in your private or public world 
without being affected by them, you may find it possible to be entertained by chaotic 
multiplicity. Anarchic postmodernism is an attractive philosophy for aesthetes. But, of 
course, it is bad news for people who are hurting. Those who are materially or 
spiritually oppressed can hardly believe that they are in no better position than their 
oppressors to evaluate their circumstances. If you are interned in a concentration camp, 
trapped in an abusive marriage, or vilified as a member of a pariah group by the media, 
the notion that your oppressors' perspective is just as good as yours will hardly prove 
a source of comfort. It will cut the nerve of responsible action, in all likelihood inducing 
a fatalistic and hopeless response to your situation. 
In Eros for the Other, Wendy Farley attempts to articulate a very different son 
of postmodernism-one that is very serious indeed about truth. For Farley, 
posrmodernism has been right to reject simplistic, unitary understandings of 
reality. Things are a good deal more complicated than Enlightenment or pre- 
Enlightenment thinkers supposed. But the right response is not to reject the idea 
of truth. It is to recognize that we discover the truth not by reducing all of reality 
to a single pattern or structure, but by attending to everything we encounter in its 
beautiful and often surprising particularity. 
The practical point here is that when we pay attention to what is other than 
ourselves, we will often be unsettled. When we really look at another person, 
another practice, another idea, another culture, we may find that what we thought 
was obvious and universal is neither. But the right conclusion is not to abandon 
the notion of truth in favor of a philosophy of "anything goes." But what will 
keep us in touch with reality, and so with truth, Farley argues, is not an a priori 
understanding that ignores the details of the reality we actually encounter, but a 
sensitive and responsive engagement with the otherness of things. This kind of 
engagement will sometimes lead to disturbing consequences. Because, however, it 
is always anchored to the irreducible reality of the other, it can never lead to the 
smug lack of concern with truth that typifies anarchic postmodernism. 
Farley notes the ways in which an emphasis on totality-on the definitive 
nature of a single theory, a single metaphysic, a single understanding of rationality 
or humanness-can suppress the truth and oppress people. Again, this is not 
because there isn't a fact of the matter about things. It is because the systems we 
use to organize our understanding of reality always fall short of the glorious 
complexity of reality itself. When we try to force-fit reality to our systems-a 
perfect instance of idolatry-we ignore the way in which this makes our 
theoretical constructs and our limited assumptions more important than the truth. 
This emphasis on otherness is not just a point about truth in the abstract. 
Though Farley is a Christian theologian, she draws on the work of such Jewish 
thinkers as Emmanuel Levinas and Hannah Arendt. Her work embodies a 
characteristically Jewish sense that truth is something to be done, and not merely 
contemplated. To acknowledge the reality of something other than oneself is to do 
it justice. The epistemological stance bonds seamlessly with the moral and political 
one: moral action begins with the recognition of the independent reality and value 
of the other, Arendt's irreducibility to my own plans and projects and purposes. 
The eros of Farley's title is the stance toward otherness she believes a full 
recognition of its reality entails. We feel the tug of eros when we are drawn toward 
something other, not because of its usefulness, but because of its inherent 
beauty-not the sort of beauty that some things have and others lack, but the 
beauty that comes as a concomitant of being unique and irreplaceable, the beauty 
that comes from being at all-and its intrinsic worth. Evos-she uses the term in its 
most general sense, not with any narrow reference to erotic love-seeks otherness, 
desires otherness, while at the same time preserving it; eros cannot eliminate the 
other without extinguishing itself. Whether we seek truth as scientists, 
philosophers, theologians, or historians, or whether we are responding to the 
particularity of other creatures, we ought, Farley argues, to exhibit an eros that 
delights in and respects their difference from ourselves. 
While defending the absolute importance of the particular, Farley does not 
suggest that we can dispense with general categories. There is no way to think 
without organizing and patterning our intellectual worlds. She argues for a careful 
appropriation of the traditional Platonic notion of Ideas. (Where many 
contemporary thinkers read Plato as ignoring particularity in favor of ideas that 
we would regard as abstractions and generalizations, Farley argues that Platonic 
thought is, in fact, highly sensitive to the distinct reality of actual persons and 
objects.) Platonic "forms . . . provide a norm by which we can engage in a moral 
struggle to draw down justice, beauty, wisdom, and wonder into historical 
existence. The immutability of the forms . . . is required . . . to provide a moral 
standard that does not dissolve into the exigencies of mightn (132). If flux and 
change were the only truth, goodness might turn into evil, the truth of today into 
tomorrow's falsehood. We need general truths and categories, and there are such 
truths and categories that answer to our need. But, Farley suggests, we need an 
understanding of ideas that is consistent with our recognition of the importance 
of particularity, an understanding she undertakes to provide. 
As a woman sensitive to women's experience, Farley is aware that the idea or 
category of "woman" has sometimes been employed oppressively to obliterate the 
differences between individual women and diverse groups of women. There is a 
great deal of suspicion among contemporary thinkers regarding the aptness of 
speaking of womanhood as a category or of purporting to identify the essence of 
what it means to be a woman. Such efforts have been criticized as treating the 
experiences and needs of all women as identical without regard to historical 
location, class, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. But Farley argues that a nuanced 
understanding of ideas allows us to continue speaking of the idea of woman, and 
so unite women in what are often common struggles. 
Farley concludes Eros for the Other with a summation that emphasizes her 
concern for patient attentiveness to the reality of other beings, and of the 
challenges and joys associated with such attentiveness. "We are called to reality," 
she says, "by its beauty, by our obligati s to it, by the high price we pay for our 
illusions."'To be sure, the "plurality % ambiguity of our world call us to a 
vigilant renunciation of totality, of possession, of presence." We cannot pretend 
to know or to control everything. "But the face of the other, the beauty and 
vulnerability of nature, calls us to responsibility. Eros traverses the distance 
between renunciation and responsibility. If only we could forgo pornographies of 
truth and find the courage to subsist in this tension, to embrace the insecurities 
and delights of a ceaseless desire for truth" (200). 
Unsurprisingly, Eros for the Other is not a program. It is a sketch of a set of 
problems, together with a number of pointers toward solutions. What is crucial for 
Farley is holding on to the reality of what is other than the self. As she develops her 
argument, she displays a clear and attractive alternative to Enlightenment 
universalism and to anarchic postmodernism's disregard for truth and justice. Which 
is not to say that she has solved all of the problems she addresses. 
Much of Farley's argument is pitched at a highly abstract level. Though she 
is, as I say, a Christian theologian, she writes in this book-by contrast with her 
earlier Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion-largely as a philosopher. There is 
nothing wrong with that. But it leads her, I think, to pay less attention than she 
might to the distinctive value of particular historical traditions in suggesting and 
warranting the claims we make as we respond to the reality of otherness. The 
problem of justification lurks in the background of her argument. I suspect it 
would have been stronger had she attended more explicitly to the ways in which 
particular traditions-and especially the Christian tradition-might provide us 
with criteria for identdying just what is to count as injustice and oppression, since, 
as she acknowledges, such identifications are not unproblematic. I suspect she fails 
to do so because of her concern with the idolatrous pretensions of traditions and 
systems of thought, which can tend often enough to obscure otherness. 
Nonetheless, her position would perhaps have been more complete had she 
explored their relevance more fully in her beautifully written book. 
Eros for the Other does not provide the only post-Enlightenment alternative 
to anarchic postmodernism. The explicit attention to community for which I have 
argued has been a constitutive feature of the work of such authors as Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and William Placher, and also surfaces in 
helpful ways in the work of Jeffrey Stout. Farley's book is perhaps best read in 
conjunction with Placher's Unapologetic 7heology or Wolterstorff's Reason within 
the Bounds of Religion. Having said this, however, I have no hesitation in 
recommending Eros for the Other as a source of useful insights and illuminating 
proposals that will enable its readers to be humble in the face of difference and 
passionate in their pursuit of truth. 
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The first edition of this work was published by Princeton University Press in 1964, 
and it soon became a standard reference work. It contains a wealth of information 
about how the ancients kept their chronological records. However, in the first edition, 
the section on Old Testament chronology was very brief, covering only 19 pages. The 
section on NT chronology, on the other hand, went into the various aspects of that 
subject in almost infmite detail. This imbalance has been corrected in the new, revised 
edition. The section on O T  chronology now covers 75 pages (195-269). 
Finegan has entered into an extensive dialogue with the literature published 
since 1964, and he includes even more detail in the section on N T  chronology. As 
a result, Finegan has changed his mind on some of the conclusions he reached in 
his first work. In the first edition, Finegan dated the birth of Jesus to 5/4 B.C., but 
now he has moved to 3/2 B.C. as the most likely date of his birth. As a result, his 
dates for the ministry and death of Jesus have changed. In the first edition, Finegan 
dated the beginning of Jesus' ministry, in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, to 26/27 
A.D. on the basis of the two-year co-regency between Augustus and Tiberius. He 
has now abandoned that earlier date in favor of 29 A.D., dating from the death of 
Augustus in 14 A.D. This has necessitated moving the date of Jesus' death from 30 
A.D., in the first edition, to 33 A.D. in the present study. One can only admire 
Professor Finegan's openness to consider new data and interpretations and to 
incorporate them into his new chronological scheme. 
The revised volume has four new sections that were not in the previous 
edition. Archaeological and Egyptological tables for chronology have been added 
(wurv-xxxvii), and standard dates are given there. He does not decide between the 
high, middle, or low chronologies for Egypt, but simply gives the dates as a range. 
An extensive new section on Sabbatical Years, Jubilees, and Priestly Courses has 
been added (1 16-138). For the Sabbatical Years, Finegan has printed the tables of 
Zuckerman (seconded by B1osser)and Wacholder side by side (they differ by one 
year). Finegan favors the older system of Zuckerman, which runs a year earlier for 
its dates than Wacholder's. No  definite date for any Jubilee is known in biblical 
or extrabiblical text; however, Finegan discusses a Qumran fragment for a possible 
application of one. He makes extensive use of chronological references from 
Qumran texts. Readers may be interested to know that one of these appears to 
give the length of time from Creation to the Exodus as 11,536 years. 
When it comes to O T  chronology, the major new addition in this edition, 
